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Introduction 
In the realm of interpersonal interactions, there are many pieces of conventional wisdom 
that dictate how most Americans ought to behave. One such example of this is that Americans 
ought to “do good” in the world. This could mean simply acting kindly to others, but more often 
it is meant as taking explicit action to promote positive change in the world. Another social norm 
is that Americans, particularly Iowans and other Midwesterners1, ought to “avoid causing 
offense.”  It is not difficult to see how these two norms sometimes collide, since positive change 
often entails the transformation of social norms that some deeply value. In this paper, I will 
examine the question of whether “doing good” in the sense of social activism may sometimes 
necessarily entail offense. I will argue that it is indeed the case that social activism and causing 
offense are typically linked, and more importantly, that a deeper understanding of this conflict of 
norms will provide a framework to guide those who wish to engage in social justice activism. 
Methodology 
My approach to this thesis will be a philosophical analysis of an issue in applied ethics. I 
will first be creating a definition of both activism and offense. However, unlike most research, 
the construction of these definitions will be not merely foundational, but central, to my thesis. 
These definitions will not be simplified like a typical dictionary definition, but will rather 
attempt to capture the complexities entailed in each concept. I will do this by analyzing various 
dictionary definitions, explicit definitions found in various literature, and implicit definitions by 
virtue of how the terms are used in various literature. 
                                               
1 Though the claim that Midwesterners have adopted this norm more so than others may be partially based on 
popular stereotypes, Rentfrow et al., 2008 have found that those in the West North Central and East North Central 
U.S. Census regions (which together make up the what is commonly known as the “Midwest”) have high levels of 
“agreeableness” based on the Big Five personality domains (Rentfrow 2010). This trait would seem to coincide with 
wanting to avoid causing offense.  
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After clarifying my working definitions and my understanding of each concept, I will 
then further analyze each concept in terms of how the two are connected. This will entail a 
philosophical analysis of each, using relevant literature in ethics, political philosophy, and other 
conceptual analyses. In addition, I will demonstrate the connection between activism and offense 
through real world examples.  
Finally, I will use these analyses to argue that effective activism and avoiding causing 
offense are incompatible goals. Given this, I will conclude that critical ethical reflection is 
necessary on the part of activists; in particular, I will explore how one could answer the question, 
“Is the cause I am undertaking worthy enough to justify causing offense?”  
Definitions 
Before analyzing the intersection of activism and offense, I will construct a definition of 
each. I will do this by analyzing various dictionary definitions, explicit definitions found in 
various literature, and implicit definitions by virtue of how the terms are used in various 
literature. My goal is to create a pragmatic definition of each, thereby getting to the root of the 
concepts I am exploring rather than trying to capture every possible usage of the terms. 
Activism 
I considered the following dictionary definitions of “activism” in developing my working 
definition. I have only included the portion of the definition that pertained to my research 
specifically. 
Webster’s New World College Dictionary, Fourth Edition 
The doctrine or policy of taking positive, direct action to achieve an end, esp. a political 
or social end. 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition 
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The use of direct, often confrontational action, such as a demonstration or strike, in 
opposition to or support of a cause. 
The Oxford American College Dictionary 
The policy or action of using vigorous campaigning to bring about political or social 
change. 
The Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition 
 A doctrine or policy of advocating energetic action. 
Among these definitions, all seem to highlight two particular concepts: action and 
progress. As for “action,” this can be seen both from its explicit usage and from the implication 
of action through words and phrases like “vigorous campaigning” and “advocating.” Though 
“progress” is not used explicitly, the concept is strongly evoked through words and phrases such 
as “positive...political and social end,” “support of a cause,” and “political or social change.”  
In the very basic sense of the word “action,” it simply means “doing something.” 
However, in the context of activism, it contains a more specific implication. To this end, 
Twentieth century philosopher and political theorist Hannah Arendt argues that there are three 
main human activities: labor, work and action (Arendt 7). Regarding action, she writes, “To act, 
in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin,...to set something into motion…. 
Because they are initium, newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, men take initiative, are 
prompted into action” (Arendt 177). What she means by this is that by simply being born a 
unique human being, all people are capable of starting something new; this initiation of “set[ting] 
something into motion” is what is entailed in when one takes “action.” 
To explain further what is meant by this, it is necessary to tie in Arendt’s concepts of 
“freedom” and “plurality” as they relate to action. While the consequence of initiation is action, 
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what allows for this initiation in the first place is the fact that every unique human being is born 
with freedom. This is one aspect that distinguishes action from labor and work; unlike the latter 
two, action is impossible without human freedom (Arendt 177). Plurality is another 
distinguishing factor between action and labor/work. Labor and work occur by way of automatic 
human processes, and thus do not theoretically require different individuals, or plurality, for their 
functioning. By contrast, action can only occur when there is a plurality of human actors; more 
clearly defining this, Arendt writes, “...the human condition of plurality…[is] living as a distinct 
and unique being among equals” (Arendt 178). Action requires that there be other individuals 
with whom one makes contact, because without this plurality, there cannot be said to be a 
society; being in the context of a society is what makes action significant in the first place, 
insofar as it affects and engages the other human actors who make up that society. Further, 
without the uniqueness of each person, which plurality entails, there would be no difference of 
opinion or behavior, and therefore no societal problems; it is the overcoming of these conflicts 
that provide the purpose for engaging in action.  
Arendt’s conception of action adds nuance to my current definitional basis for activism. It 
reinforces the idea of bringing forth something new, whether it be an idea, an argument, a 
physical action, or a combination of those. This relates to the dictionary definitions that 
referenced the bringing about of change--itself a concept that implies something different than 
that which is already occurring. In addition, Arendt introduces the idea of plurality as being 
necessary to action, which is very relevant to how activism functions. For instance, if there 
hypothetically existed only one person in the world (or perhaps someone stranded on a desert 
island with no possibility of future human contact), then activism would be impossible. This is 
because there would be nothing to take action for; societal change requires the existence of a 
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“society,” which cannot occur with only one person.  
 This connects to “progress”  in activism, which goes further to imply not only change, 
but change toward a better state of affairs than society is in currently. To be clear, one person’s 
“progress” is another’s “regress,” or what they would consider to be the opposite of progress. 
Discussing societal progress in this context is not intended to be an objective moral statement, 
but rather that, from the perspective of the activists in question, they see a particular social end or 
goal as being positive. It is necessary that the definition of activism concord with this point to 
ensure there is no bias in my ethical assessment of activism-caused offense. In other words, I 
must be able to morally justify offense even in a case where I would be the one feeling offended. 
The examples employed later on in this paper will clearly demonstrate the usage of “progress” 
and “activism” in this way.  
 This assessment brings me to a pragmatic definition of activism: Activism is initiating an 
action toward the goal of societal progress. This can take many forms; “social” progress does 
not necessarily imply stereotypical grassroots activism, such picketing at a protest (though it 
does certainly include this form of activism). Rather, activism can come in the form of a 
Washington lobbyist advocating for same-sex marriage, or pushing for the implementation of a 
particular corporate loophole in exchange for reelection campaign finances. Even though 
corporate lobbyists are not typically thought of as activists, all lobbyists are activists given that 
they are pushing for what they see as societal progress in the form of policy changes that benefit 
their company or organization (which they likely view as important to the economy, particular 
segments of the population, and/or society as a whole). While this may seem to be an 
unconventional example of activism, it is an important one to analyze so as to set the boundaries 
for what is included in the activity; this is necessary to giving an accurate analysis of the 
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interaction between activism and offense later on.  
Offense 
As with “activism,” I utilized definitions of “offense” from four reputable dictionaries in 
developing my working definition, and have only included that which pertains to my specific 
research. 
Webster’s New World College Dictionary, Fourth Edition 
The act of creating resentment, hurt feelings, displeasure, etc. 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition 
A violation or infraction of a moral or social code; a transgression or sin.  
The Oxford American College Dictionary 
A thing that constitutes a violation of what is judged to be right or natural. Annoyance or 
resentment brought about by a perceived insult to or disregard for oneself or one’s standards or 
principles.  
The Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition 
Feeling of being hurt, painful or unpleasant sensation, pain. Offended or wounded 
feeling; displeasure, annoyance, or resentment caused (voluntarily or involuntarily) to a person. 
These dictionary definitions mainly focus on offense being a negative feeling connected 
with some sort of violation of a belief or norm that one holds dear. Words and phrases such as 
resentment, anger, displeasure, insult, hurt feelings, disregard for, wounded feelings, annoyance, 
and disgust all evoke a strong sense of negative emotions. With regard to what one does when 
they cause feelings of offense in another, several related concepts are present, such as creating 
negative feelings in another, breaking a commonly accepted rule or principle, violating what is 
judged to be right or natural, wounding the feelings or susceptibilities of another, and inciting 
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negative emotions. On the receiving end of offense, these definitions focus on the perception of a 
violation of, attack on, and insult to one’s moral law, divine law, social code, standards, or 
principles.  
While the dictionaries do not say this directly, there is reason to believe that offense can 
also occur in connection with a perceived attack on one’s identity. As one’s beliefs and one’s 
identity tend to be connected, having others advocate against those beliefs can be viewed as a 
personal affront. Even if the activism is not against the person in particular, but rather directed 
toward a larger group to which they belong, the nature of collective identity is such that an attack 
on one’s personal identity will still likely be felt (Meyer et.al. 47). 
Psychologists David R. Sigmon and C.R. Snyder have constructed the following 
definition of offense-taking for the purpose of a study: “Offense-taking is defined as the 
perceived deprivation of what is rightfully due to a person” (445). Further, they write, “For 
offense-taking to occur, the offended person must ascribe responsibility for the deprivation to 
another person or object. Also, the phrase ‘what is rightfully due’ implies that the individual 
taking offense has an applicable concept of justice, and is holding that other person accountable 
for having transgressed against that justice concept” (445-446).  
 Sigmon and Snyder may not realize it (though it is possible they may), but they have 
engaged in a philosophical analysis of the concept of offense. The rest of their study focuses on 
the factors that make one susceptible to offense-taking, but the definition they use as the basis of 
their study has come about mainly through philosophical, not scientific, means. However, this 
definition is still likely based on their empirical observations of what self-identified “offense” 
looks like. In particular, the idea of transgression of one’s concept of justice seems to fit with 
what has been discussed previously about a perceived attack on the social norms to which one 
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subscribes. 
Based on this analysis of offense, I have constructed the following working definition: 
Offense is a perceived unjust attack on or violation of one’s deeply held beliefs, norms, and/or 
sense of identity. To be clear, individuals’ reactions to feeling offense may differ greatly; this 
point will be covered in greater detail later in the paper. However, this does not change the 
definition of what it is to feel offense.  
Intersection of Activism and Offense 
Based on the definitions I have developed, I see there being a definitive intersection 
between activism and offense. First, Arendt’s conception of action, which entails freedom and 
plurality, implies that offense is likely. This is because action is not intelligible without a 
plurality of unique actors who represent varied perspectives, interests, values, and norms. To 
reiterate, if there were hypothetically only one person in the world, there would be no society in 
which to act and no norms or policies to attempt to change. The same can be said for offense, in 
that a single individual cannot offend or be offended; other human actors with whom to interact 
are necessary. Thus, there being a plurality of free actors is a necessary condition for both 
activism and offense to take place. 
Second, the social change which can be brought about by activism often entails the 
transformation of social norms that some people deeply value. By the “social norms,” I mean 
ideals that are taken as given in everyday interactions. Thus, when one sees another person 
working to transform one’s deeply held ideals, one will naturally experience offense.  
Finally, as discussed earlier, the close connection between beliefs and identity, including 
identities associated with membership to a larger group, tends to be a catalyst for feeling offense 
when action is taken against those particular beliefs. Because activism entails advocating for 
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social change, those who identify with opposing beliefs, which support current norms, will view 
the activism as being an attack on their identity, thus resulting in offense.  
If my argument thus far is correct, then it follows from the previous discussion of the 
intersection of activism and offense that doing effective activism and simultaneously avoiding 
causing any offense are incompatible goals.   
Examples 
 In order to demonstrate the real world application of these philosophical ideas, I will give 
four examples of activism (two from history and two that are existent currently) and point out 
how they exemplify my above analysis of the relationship between activism and offense, namely 
that the former almost always entails the latter.2 
Civil Rights 
Civil rights activists pushed for full social and legal equality for African-Americans, 
especially during the 1950s and 1960s. Some of their activism tactics included engaging in civil 
disobedience such as sit-ins and having black students show up to whites-only schools, holding 
marches and rallies, and promoting voting registration among African Americans (Bankston 
2013). As civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. wrote in his Letter from a Birmingham Jail 
about the actions of white civil rights activists, “They, unlike many of their moderate brothers, 
have recognized the urgency of the moment and sensed the need for powerful ‘action’ antidotes 
to combat the disease of segregation” (King). This displays how these activists were taking 
action in order to affect what they viewed to be important social progress.  
One example of the offense caused by these activists is that the reforms for which they 
                                               
2 It is worth pointing out that not all of these social movements are ones that I support. This is important because if I 
only chose to exemplify offense caused by social movements I do support, I would risk giving a biased analysis. By 
including a movement whose activism offends me, I am exhibiting the universal nature of the framework. 
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advocated conflicted with many people’s beliefs and norms about race. In addition, the message 
of equality on the part of the activists violated some white people’s sense of identity in society; 
the activists fought directly against their notion of white people holding a superior place in the 
social hierarchy than people of color. This can be seen in much of the rhetoric of the 
segregationists, including this excerpt from a 1942 newspaper editorial: “‘The negro has his 
rightful place in the American way of life...as for accepting on a plane of equality, as is being 
advocated by some negro leaders--it must and shall not be done’” (Ward 41).  
Women’s Suffrage  
 Women’s suffrage activists in the United States fought against laws barring women from 
the right to vote. During the movement that spanned from the mid 1800s until the ratification of 
the 19th Amendment in 1920, activists held conventions and formed organizations to bring 
publicity to the issue, mobilizing women to be vocal and participate in public demonstrations 
such as marches (Encyclopedia Britannica 2013). In this way, women’s suffrage activists 
attempted to (and eventually did) affect what they saw as positive social change.  
 Like the civil rights activists (though before them, chronologically), these activists 
offended others based on the fact that they caused people to question their norms and beliefs 
about a particular group which also entailed the questioning of their identity in relation to that 
group. This can be seen by the fact that the work of women’s suffrage activists conflicted with 
many people’s beliefs and norms about gender, exemplified by one anti-suffrage petition that 
deemed the suffrage movement as “radical and its followers as immoral and antifamily, in 
‘rebellion against the laws, human and Divine”’ (Marshall 22). 
In particular, for some men, the notion of women’s opinions having equal weight at the 
ballot box called into question their identities in both the public and private sphere. Because men 
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had previously been the only ones given full access to the political affairs entailed in the public 
sphere and women had been limited to private sphere matters of the household, some men felt 
that women having more power in the public sphere would dilute and undermine their power and 
privileged status, thus threatening their identity as ruling member of the family.  
Anti-Abortion 
 Anti-abortion activists, self identified as having a “pro-life” stance, fight against legalized 
abortion. Some of their tactics include protesting outside of abortion clinics and holding 
demonstrations with graphic depictions of aborted fetuses, though they are also engaged in 
political action by mobilizing people to vote for referenda that will limit legal abortion and 
politicians who will work to do the same. Given that they view embryos and fetuses in the womb 
as having the same rights as someone post-birth, anti-abortion activists deem legally terminating 
a pregnancy to be a form of murder in which the state is complicit (Kaplan et al. 2013). In 
fighting against this, anti-abortion activists are promoting what they view as positive social 
change: a world in which murder is drastically reduced, and no longer a legal and state-supported 
option. 
 For those who see abortion as a right for women (at least up to some point in a 
pregnancy), they may be offended by the message of anti-abortion activists. Some people may 
see anti-abortion activism as conflicting their with their value of or belief in personal choice in 
which freedom and moral responsibility are grounded. Because they view an embryo or fetus as 
being part of the body of a woman, they believe that a pregnant woman should be on able to 
choose if she wants an embryo or fetus connected to and dependent on her body. This rhetoric is 
apparent in pro-choice activism today, as seen in the following excerpts of a 2005 New York 
Times letter to the editor: “It’s my body. There’s a reason that’s a rallying cry for the pro-choice 
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movement...It is a nightmare to imagine that [the law] could require a woman to relinquish 
control over her body and life in order to become an unwilling vessel” (Ritchie). Additionally, 
anti-abortion activism may attack some women’s identities as being an ethical decision makers. 
This is due to the fact that anti-abortion activists view abortion as murder, and murder of 
innocents in particular; this is an act universally regarded as profoundly immoral.  
Same-sex Marriage 
Same-sex marriage activists, self identified as advocates of “marriage equality,” fight for 
legal marriage to be extended to same-sex couples. Though much of their activism involves 
direct political action by mobilizing people to vote for same-sex marriage or politicians who 
support the issue, they also hold protests and marches (Pritchard 2013). Because they see 
homosexuality as being an equally legitimate form of sexuality to heterosexuality, these activists 
believe same-sex couples should be afforded equal legal marriage rights; to them, this fight is 
causing societal progress, since it is extended the ideal of equality to another minority group that 
has been denied equal treatment under the law.  
 For those against homosexuality, they may be offended by what is advocated for on the 
part of same-sex marriage activists. Some people may see same-sex marriage as conflicting with 
both social norms and their religious views of what marriage entails. In this sense, some view 
same-sex marriage as being doubly wrong--it goes against both their notion of a correct society 
and what they believe to be true as communicated by a religious authority or sacred text. This is 
apparent in much of the rhetoric of those opposed to same-sex marriage, as demonstrated by 
these excerpts of a 2013 letter to the editor in the Myrtle Beach Sun News:  
The Bible condemns homosexuality as an immoral and unnatural sin. Leviticus 18:22 
identifies it as an abomination, a detestable sin...In regard to the family, psychologists 
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contend that a union between a man and woman in which both spouses serve as good 
gender role models is the best environment in which to raise well-adjusted 
children...‘Marriage is a very sacred union between a man and a woman, and to call 
same-sex unions marriage is a tragedy’ (Bethel).  
Adding to this, same-sex marriage could cause some to question their heteronormative identity; 
that is to say, they are unfamiliar with how a marriage operates when there is not one man and 
one woman in the relationship, and this causes them to feel less secure in their identity as being 
part of a marriage defined by heteronormative gender roles.  
A Framework for Activists: Ethical and Practical Considerations 
As with much of practical philosophy, the solution to the question of how to reconcile 
effective activism while also causing offense is not without ambiguities. Both ethical and 
practical implications must be considered in doing so. 
For some, it is central to their conception of an ideal world that offense be limited. For 
others, it is imperative that social progress be made, despite the cost of how it affects detractors 
emotionally. Given this state of affairs, weighing various options against each other is inevitable. 
That is to say, there may not be a perfect option for how to create social change and also abide 
by the accepted social norms, but then again, if society functioned in such a morally 
unambiguous fashion, it is unlikely social change would have to occur in the first place; all 
people with the capacity for both rationality and moral judgment would behave the same way. 
Since this is not the case, it is inevitable that ethical judgments must weigh two or more less-
than-ideal cases in order to find the one that best concords with one’s principles and goals.  
 This being said, there are varying degrees of “less-than-ideal” cases, and I argue that in 
the realm of social change, offense in itself is not an ethical reason to abstain from the activity. In 
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addition, as a framework for activists, pragmatism must always, in some way, be taken into the 
equation. After all, activism is not only about sitting around in armchairs, so to speak, and 
discussing what a better, more just, more ethical world would look like. Though critical 
reflection and discussion over what constitutes a just cause are necessary precursors to activism, 
truly engaging in activism requires action; it is an activity that seeks to actually change the minds 
and behavior of others so that that better, more just, more ethical world may come into existence. 
Ignoring the psychological and other research behind what actually causes people to change their 
minds and behavior makes for ineffective activism, which arguably is not much “activism” at all. 
This means that, to the best of their knowledge and ability, activists ought to act in such a way 
that they can, in good conscience, know that they have done the best they can to realistically 
affect social change.  
 This is supported by Kant’s notion of the “good will,” which is his basis for moral action. 
As he writes in the first section of Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, “Nothing in the 
world--indeed nothing even beyond the world--can possibly be conceived which could be called 
good without qualification except a good will” (Kant 9). What this means is that even if one’s 
actions result in an undesirable outcome, as long as they had a good will, their action can be 
considered moral. By “good will,” Kant means a will to action that respects the integrity and 
dignity of those with whom one interacts.3 Applied to activism specifically, this means that 
activism is morally good if and only if the activist in question had a good will. 
 This being said, the norm in question--“don’t offend”-- is not entirely without basis; it 
does not appear to be human nature, after all, to “enjoy” being offended. Some people seem 
more prone to offense than others, but regardless of what causes the psychological sensation, it is 
                                               
3 This is found in the second formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, which will be explained in greater detail 
later on in this paper.  
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not regarded as a happy or fulfilling experience. However, there are still two arguments as to 
why offense ought not be avoided outright.  
First, on the societal level, if the change for which one acts is positive, then it is worth 
causing the feeling of offense in others, both ethically and pragmatically. While this could 
certainly be considered a subjective value statement, most mainstream ethical theories would 
support such an assessment, because a state of affairs that is more positive by definition includes 
a more positive ethical state of affairs. And, pragmatically, even if some members of a society 
are offended, there may be others who, by this action, discover the opportunity to organize as a 
group and advocate for their cause. 
 Second, on an individual level, offense is a subjective reaction to action and may 
fluctuate as time goes by; even if someone is offended at one point in time, they may not be 
offended at a later point. Offense is a complex emotion that may remain stagnant or augment in 
intensity, but it also may diminish over time. It is possible that fluctuation in the level of offense 
will alter the willingness of one to change his or her mind in supporting a particular cause. This 
means that activists who wish to be effective ought to consider, rather than disregard, the effect 
that offense has on individuals whose beliefs and actions they are trying to change.  
It is also relevant to point out that for some activists, having been offended may have 
been the fuel that first ignited their sense of a call to action (Meyer et al. 128). Offense can 
function as a powerful source of change, but that should indicate two things to activists. First, 
even if they are offended, vehemently disagreeing with someone on a particular issue, they must 
be able to recognize the strong connection between belief and identity felt by the “other side.”  
Instead of demonizing the opposition, it may be more ethical and productive to recognize the 
difficulty of changing their strongly-held belief, particularly one that evokes the feeling offense 
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when not shared by others. This does not mean that activists should aim not to offend, but it does 
mean that they should not disregard the fact that their opposition may be offended. It is important 
to recognize that people believe what they do for complex reasons.  
While I am not able to unpack this complexity in the context of this paper, I can point out 
that contributing to the complexity is the sense of community and identity many derive from 
holding such beliefs; as previously explained, most activists can likely relate to this. For this 
reason, even if activism is aimed directly at changing the ideas and actions of others, the 
emphasis should be on just that--changing the ideas and actions of others, and not on demonizing 
the people as people.  
For both ethical and practical reasons, it is important that activists refrain from making 
those whose beliefs they wish to change into a demonized “other.” One reason it is unethical to 
treat the opposition in this manner may be best explained by Kant’s second formulation of the 
categorical imperative:4 “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that 
of another, always as an end and never as a mean only” (Kant 46). For activists, this means that 
regardless of the beliefs of the people they are trying to persuade, they must always act in such a 
way that they respect their opposition’s dignity and integrity--even if they do not respect their 
beliefs.  
As this pertains to the practical implications of offending people, not only does ignoring 
that the opposition has experienced offense fail to uphold Kant’s second formulation of the 
categorical imperative, but it also fails to consider the reality of belief transformation. Simply 
causing offense and not engaging the other side in a way that considers their humanity creates a 
barrier to potential mutual understanding and transformation. Although activists are working to 
                                               
4 Kant’s categorical imperative serves as a deontological standard for what is considered moral action. 
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change the beliefs and actions of others, they must also open themselves up to dialogue with the 
other side, leaving open the possibility of personal transformation. This does not mean that 
activists must concede points they do not agree with, or even feel the need to “respect” beliefs; 
on the contrary, activists may often be fully entitled to think that the beliefs of the other side are 
immoral, illogical, irrational, and the like. However, activists must still be willing to listen to 
what their opposition has to say. This is because doing so (a) indicates that they recognize their 
opposition to be human beings who deserve respect, which includes at least considering their 
arguments, and also (b) makes for more effective activism by showing the opposition that their 
main concern is with making positive social change, rather than just shoving their beliefs down 
the throat of others or intentionally offending those who disagree. And by engaging in this 
dialogue, activists may, in fact, themselves experience a transformation of beliefs, or at least a 
transformation in the level of understanding they have of the other side. This openness to self-
transformation is important in activism if the ultimate aim is to create a better society. This is 
because nothing is absolute, and therefore activists must be open to the possibility that they may 
be wrong. 
 Another practical consideration related to causing offense is that even when activists only 
intend to target beliefs, the opposition may feel an attack on their identity, evoking a much 
stronger, more negative reaction. Separating one’s ideas and actions from one’s identity can be 
extremely difficult, both personally and with reference to others. And to some degree, it may not 
be wise to completely rid oneself of one’s connection between identity and ideas. As seen, the 
sense of personal and collective identity it brings can be a very strong driving force behind one’s 
activism.  As such, there is no perfect answer as to how to address the connection between one’s 
identity and his or her actions and ideas; and even if I could construct the formula for the activist 
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utopia, it would be almost worthless in light of the fact that the connection between identity and 
beliefs seems too deep in American culture to easily change.  
In this sense, perhaps it necessary to simply accept the connection between beliefs and 
identity, and not try to figure out how to parse the two. If belief transformation implies identity 
transformation, perhaps the latter ought to be considered as a goal of activism as well. In 
addition, there is not anything necessarily morally wrong with trying to change someone’s 
identity--as long as it is done in a way that respects the humanity of the person in question, 
without demonizing or treating them as an “other.” And to be clear, this may not be as applicable 
to some issues as it is for others. For instance, it may not take identity transformation to change 
the belief that one ought to switch to compact fluorescent light bulbs, especially if the person in 
question already identifies as someone who cares about the environment. However, for belief 
transformation that directly conflicts with someone’s current identity, such as trying to convince 
a member of the National Rifle Association that she or he ought to support gun control 
legislation, identity transformation must necessarily occur as well. And it is without controversy 
that identity transformation is rarely an easy or rapid process, often inhibited by feelings of 
offense as a result of others telling them that their current beliefs and identity ought to be 
changed. 
This brings us back to the problem in question: how do activists address the difficulty of 
changing the beliefs, and often the identity, of others? The primary solution, it seems to me, is to 
bear this problem in mind and put themselves in the shoes of their opposition. Drawing on 
Kant’s ethics and the notion of being open to the opposition, even though people may be on 
different sides of a specific issue, everyone has experienced what it is like to feel personally 
offended; this allows activists to be able to understand, at least to some extent, the effect they are 
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having on the offended party. This will make both for more ethical action, and for more effective 
action, as well. This is because when one thinks like those they are trying to influence, they are 
more likely to be reminded of their humanity, as well as be more effective in influencing them. 
After all, we are all more open to being influenced when we see that the others with whom we 
are interacting care about us as persons. 
Based on this analysis of ethical and practical considerations, I have constructed the 
following basic framework for activists: Offense is ethically permissible if the activism that 
causes it seeks to affect what is, in good conscience, positive social change, and is done so in a 
way that respects the dignity of people whose beliefs and/or identity it seeks to change. Activists 
ought also to consider what will most effectively affect positive social change, so long as the 
tactics used are within reasonable standards of ethical permissibility. 
Significance and Conclusion 
 This analysis alerts activists to the difficulty of giving equal weight to the norms of 
"doing good" and "avoiding offense." In doing so, it calls into question the Midwestern/Iowan 
social norm of trying hard to avoid offense by giving a philosophical basis for why activism 
ought to be given greater moral weight. This makes for a more realistic and philosophically 
sound framework for engaging in activism. 
 Seeing as engaging in activism and also avoiding causing offense may yield a conflict of 
norms, it would follow that some activists may wish to entirely disregard the consideration of 
avoiding offense as an important social norm. However, this is not the message I wish to convey. 
Instead of ignoring offense, activists ought to recognize offense when it occurs, and use it as a 
reminder of the ambiguous nature of morality. In other words, if someone is offended, it 
indicates the existence of a difference in, and even conflict among, norms, or at least in the 
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implementation of those norms. Conflict reminds activists of the moral ambiguity of all 
normative claims, especially the fact that we do not have direct access to absolute moral norms. 
Taking this point into consideration, in order to exercise moral responsibility, activists therefore 
ought to think critically about their own values, asking in particular: “Is the cause I am 
undertaking worthy enough to justify causing offense?”  
 Although answering this question in its entirety would extend beyond the purposes of this 
paper, it is a question that is so intimately connected to my larger analysis of activism and 
offense that I will briefly address it here. In answering the above question, activists ought to 
consider which norms justify causing offense as a result of their activism. Though ethical 
evaluations are, again, ambiguous in nature, the construction of a moral framework could serve 
to guide activists as they critically reflect on their actions.  
 As an example of what this process may look like, it would likely be useful to, as an 
activist, ask oneself a series of questions. First, “Is there an ethical system that justifies my cause 
in the first place? If so, what does it look like?” If there is no system of ethics that can justify 
one’s cause, that would be a good indicator that the activist needs to probe at the larger question 
of why she or he feels this is a cause one ought to undertake. Otherwise, he or she may risk 
pushing for something for merely personal or emotional reasons rather than a more ethically 
sound justification, such as might be found in Kantian deontological ethics, Mill’s utilitarianism, 
Aristotelian virtue ethics, and the like. Though I do not necessarily abide by any of the 
aforementioned ethical systems (I find myself to be more of an ethical pragmatist,) they at least 
all have the virtue of being grounded in reasonable argumentation as well as being intended as 
universal systems; that is to say, the validity of each system lies in its hypothetical 
intersubjectivity, that is to say, its ability to be held as true by everyone. I find potential 
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intersubjectivity to be a good basis for justifying one’s activism, because, if activists cannot 
conceive of reasonable arguments as to why everyone ought to agree with the system behind 
their activism, then they ought to reconsider how reasonable it is to push for that cause on a 
societal level. Falling short of the possibility of including “everyone” in the system would itself, 
by its very nature, fall short of the system being just, since it would privilege some people over 
others. 
 After establishing a sound ethical basis, activists should ask: “What is the nature of the 
offense I would be causing? Would it be relatively trivial offense, or would it be deep offense, 
felt for reasons with a potentially intersubjective basis?” One way of going about this would be 
to assess if the beliefs, norms, and/or sense of identity that the activism is attacking are actually 
worthy in themselves. For instance, take activists who engage in blowing up city infrastructure as 
a form of environmental protest. If upon further reflection those activists come to see that their 
activism violates the deeply held belief that people ought not be killed unless as they as 
individuals did something that justifies death, those activists may realize both that they are 
causing a deep level of offense, and that those who are deeply offended are justified in feeling 
that way because a potentially universalizable moral principle (not killing those who do not 
deserve it) has been broken. As a result, activists may come to realize that their activism (or at 
least the tactics involved) are no longer justified. On the other hand, if environmental justice 
activists were to cause offense simply by making people question their identity as being the type 
of person who lives in an environmentally friendly way, the level of offense could probably be 
considered unharmful and trivial; as there is no reasonable ethical principle that is being broken, 
this alone would not provide a rationale for the activism to not be considered justified.  
 Finally, after considering the above, activists can go back to the original question: “Is the 
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cause I am undertaking worthy enough to justify causing offense?” While there is no perfect 
method of considering this question, I find that activists can better justify causing offense with 
their activism if it meets two criteria: (a) the activism itself is rooted in a potentially 
intersubjectively held system of ethics or principles, and (b) the offense they are causing does not 
come about by disregarding the humanity of those whose beliefs they are trying to change. While 
this type of framework, again, is still largely based on what is considered “progress” from an 
individual’s perspective, I believe it nonetheless adds a broader philosophical understanding to 
the nature of the intersection of activism and offense, including the types of larger questions 
activists ought to consider before engaging in activism that will, almost undoubtedly, offend.  
Further Research 
Though this paper gives a preliminary analysis of the ethical implications of doing 
activism and avoiding causing offense, there remain questions that require further research. One 
such area is that of the conceptual nature of intersubjectivity as an ethical norm. How does it 
relate to ethical action? Is there a sound basis for the assumption that an action is more ethical 
the more people are included in it? If answered, these questions would provide activists a more 
solid ethical framework. 
Additionally, due to the philosophical nature of this paper, I was not able to investigate 
many of the empirical questions that are necessary to consider. In particular, it is important for 
activists to know what makes for effective activism. Do some activism tactics cause more or less 
offense than others? If so, what are they, and why? Answering this question would be useful for 
developing a more practical framework for activists, particularly in light of the second research 
question I would address: How does offense positively or negatively affect belief 
transformation? While common sense would indicate a negative correlation between having 
 McGraw 23 
one’s beliefs challenged and changing said beliefs, it is worth researching whether there is an 
empirical basis for this. Hypothetically, if it were discovered that feeling offended caused the 
questioning of one’s beliefs to the extent that they would be likely to reconsider and eventually 
change them, activists may then want to actually try to offend. 
 Even if the aforementioned questions are answered, however, one further empirical 
question remains crucial to an applied ethical framework for activists: Are there any harmful 
psychological effects to feeling offense? If so, what are they? Though most offense would not 
appear to be harmful in any seriously way, it is certainly possible that some deep level of offense 
could trigger a post-traumatic stress disorder reaction or something of the like. While this is 
likely the exception and not the rule regarding offense, it is still worth considering in my ethical 
analysis of whether or the goals of activism always take precedence over avoiding offense. If and 
when further research can be done on all of these questions, there will be a strong basis for 
activists to make good ethical and practical decisions as they go about their activism.  
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